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Abstract
Party switching can pose a severe threat to party unity and deepen internal party
division. To date, research on party switching has either focused on the individual
motivations for changing party or on the effects of macro-level settings. The role of
party-level variables, however, has received surprisingly little attention in the literature.
In particular the impact of ideology has rarely been assessed. This paper tests whether
specific aspects related to parties’ ideology (i.e. extremism, isolation, authoritarianism,
programmatic clarity and stability) are linked to different levels of defection. To this
purpose I rely on an original database on party switching in twelve Western European
countries from 1999 to 2015, supplemented with variables from the Chapel Hill Expert
Survey. The results of multilevel negative binomial analyses show that indeed ideology
and its various components have a substantial impact on the scope of switching. For
instance, parties promoting authoritarian values suffer from a higher number of defectors.
Moreover, parties with more unstable labels seem to be more subjected to switching. This
paper improves our understanding of how party ideology is related to party unity and,
more generally, to legislative dynamics.
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Introduction
To perform its functions, a representative democracy requires united political parties
(Bowler, Farrell, and Katz 1999). Party unity is necessary for cabinet stability, policy
bargaining, but also to ensure politicians’ accountability. The way in which parties act
as unitary actors has been challenged on two grounds. On the one hand, several studies
(Carty 2004; Bolleyer 2012) have shown that from an organizational perspective, parties
are not monolithic entities, but rather a "complex and variegated sets of persons and
structures, each of which are, or could be, independent actors within the party" (Olson
2003, p.165). This has led scholars to study more in depth intra-party organizations, that
is, whether and how members organize into factions and the impact that these subgroups
have on, for instance, cabinet durability (Saalfeld 2009), policy-making (Giannetti and
Laver 2009), party splits (Ceron 2015), party cohesion and discipline (Depauw and Martin
2009) and electoral volatility (Gherghina 2014). On the other hand, the literature has also
shown that parties not only organize into factions, but they also act in a non-unitary way
and their members in parliament (MPs) do not always stick to the party line. Research
conducted, e.g., by Kam (2009) and Sieberer (2006) has shown that rebellion votes are
not so infrequent in Western democracies. Therefore, party unity varies across countries,
parties (Close and Gherghina 2017) and over time.
In extreme circumstances, rebellious MPs change party affiliation and such a
behaviour, usually called "party switching", raises threats to party stability, unity or
credibility (O’brien and Shomer 2013) and to voters’ ability to hold their
representatives accountable (Heller and Mershon 2009). Additionally, defections can
affect policy-making within assemblies or even endanger the stability of governments
(Giannetti and Laver 2001). Finally, party switching has also substantial theoretical
implications. Indeed, it sheds light on party change and dynamics within election and it
might be considered as an alternative way of measuring party unity in parliament.
Previous studies on switching have either analysed the reasons that drive switchers
or the institutional settings that make this behaviour more likely to occur. In other
words, the focus has either been on individuals and their motivations (Di Virgilio,
Giannetti, and Pinto 2012; Heller and Mershon 2005) or on countries and their
vulnerability to this phenomenon (McLaughlin 2012; Kreuzer and Pettai 2009). This
paper adopts an approach that is more similar to the institutional one, but it focuses
on political parties. The role of party characteristics on defection has always been
recognized by the literature (Di Virgilio, Giannetti, and Pinto 2012; Heller and
Mershon 2005). However, party features are usually not tested per se, but they are used
2
as proxies to uncover switchers’ goals. For instance, Gherghina (2016) tests whether
parties in opposition are more subjected to switching in order to see whether MPs are
driven by career advancement concerns. As party features are not at the centre of the
explanation, we still know very little about whether and how party characteristics are
related to different switching rates, both theoretically and empirically.
In particular, few studies have explored the connection between ideology and unity
(Owens 2003). This paper aims at filling this gap, by exploring whether ideology can
explain some of the variation in the level of defections across countries and parties. In
order to test my hypotheses I rely on an original dataset on party switching in twelve
Western European countries from 1999 to 2015 and supplement it with variables from
the Chapel Hill Expert Surveys (CHES)(Polk et al. 2017; Bakker et al. 2015) and the
ParlGov database (Döring and Manow 2015). The article is structured as follows: after
a discussion of the theory and related hypotheses, I present the research design and the
measurement of variable; in the third section I show the results of several statistical
models and I conclude with some final remarks.
Theory and hypotheses
The literature on party switching has usually tried to uncover the motivations that lead
politician to cross the floor. MPs are considered as rational actors who try to maximize
their interest and they change party in order to serve their goals (Heller and Mershon
2005). This stream of literature has enhanced our knowledge of individual reasons for
changing party, yet it has not been fully able to explain why the scope of switching varies
across countries, parties and time. If politicians are driven by similar goals, (identified in
literature as policy, office and vote (Müller and Strøm 1999)), this does not account for
the fact that defections are not so common among all political parties in Europe. There
must be something else. This paper moves away from the individual perspective and
focuses on the relationship between party characteristics and the patterns of switching. In
particular I analyse one macro-feature, namely ideology. So far, the connection between
ideology and switching has been researched only by Mejia Acosta (2004) in his analysis
of defection in Ecuador. The literature has more often looked at whether the distance
between an MP ideal point and the policy preferences of his/her party affect the decision
to switch (Desposato 2006; Pinto 2015). Thus, the link between parties’ ideology and
their vulnerability to switching has not received large attention so far.
Ideology affects the probability of a party to witness switching for two reasons. First,
according to Sartori (1976) ideology is highly correlated to cohesion. Similarly, Owens
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(2003) states that parties’ values are a key factor to explain their level of cohesion and
discipline. The mechanism linking ideology and loyalty (one of the dimensions of party
unity) has been analysed by Close (2016), who illustrates how ideology affects both MPs’
perception of their role and party organizations. Ideology shapes the representational
style that legislators adopt: e.g., liberal parties embody values as individualism and –
as a consequence – their MPs will behave in a more individualistic manner. Ideology
also affects parties’ organizational structures and the level of internal democracy, that
– in turn – might have an influence over legislators’ behaviour (Gauja 2013). To put
it shortly, ideology potentially affects MPs’ attitudes and behaviour both directly and
indirectly. As ideology affects unity, then most likely it also influences switching, which
represents an extreme forms of disunity.
Second, according the categories developed by Hirschman (1970), Kato (1998) and, in
this same issue, by Pedersen and Nielsen, for certain MPs "exit" (that is changing party)
is sometimes a more valuable option than "voice". The decision of exiting versus staying
in the party comes at specific costs for legislators. I argue that among the many factors
that may determine these costs there is also ideology. Indeed, parties’ ultimate values
affects the room granted to MPs to express their discontent. Certain parties encourage
and tolerate much more that their legislators and members voice their disagreement. In
other groups, on the contrary, dissent is not allowed, with the result that MPs – in case
of conflict – have no option but exit their party. To put it simply, my argument is that
since the exit and voice are inversely related, switching (exit) occurs more frequently in
those parties in which is more difficult to express dissatisfaction (voice).
Nevertheless, as López and Close (2016) underline, ideology is an extremely complex
concept, that can only be partially grasped using parties’ ideological position on the left-
right scale. For this reason, this paper looks at the theoretical and empirical connection
between switching and different understandings of ideology: the spatial dimension, with
the extremity of parties’ position (H1) and their isolation (H2), parties’ values (H3), with
their clarity (H4) and stability over time (H5). Let us now turn to each of these variables
and explain how the may influence defection.
Extremism and Isolation
Although party placement is the most used proxy for ideology, its impact over party
switching has been rarely tested. Moreover, a clear theoretical argument linking
ideological placement and switching is missing. If the relationship between party
position and defection is still unclear, there is another factor that instead has received
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more attention in the literature, i.e. ideological extremism. The argument is that what
matters is the extremity of party position, rather than ideological placement per se.
When a party is placed at the extreme of the ideological spectrum, its MPs can only
switch towards the centre. In other words, they have fewer options compared to
members of centrist parties, who instead face appeals from two sides (Morgenstern
2003). Moreover, extremist parties are usually believed to have a clearer ideology
(Mejia Acosta 2004) and they are generally more faithful to their values and less
sensitive to public opinion, which makes them also more cohesive (Rahat 2007).
However, for what concerns switching, these expectations might not apply. In fact,
extremist parties stress the importance of principles and values, thus, the internal
ideological discussion might be more acute. Additionally, the willingness to remain
faithful to ideology (Rahat 2007) might restrict the space for legislators with alternative
views. Therefore, in case of conflict or excessive debate around a specific issue, the only
realistic option for dissidents is leaving the party. This argument is coherent with
Hirschman’s scheme: in extremist parties it might be more difficult for MPs to voice
their discontent. Discipline might be so tight that – in case of conflict – there are no
alternative but switching. The expectation therefore is opposite than what posed by
the literature so far: more extremist parties might be more disciplined, but this might
lead to a higher number of switchers.
Extremism looks at the ideology of individual parties. However, the opportunity of
switching might be also affected by the presence/absence of other political parties that
are ideologically close to the one of origin. If a party is isolated in the political space,
it is more difficult for potential switchers to find a group able to welcome them, simply
because there are no alike parties around. Not only the availability of similar parties is
lower, but also the ideological "transformation" undertaken by defectors is deeper and
more difficult to achieve and justify to voters. On the contrary, when a party is relatively
close to others (a likely circumstance, especially under coalition governments) it is easier
to find akin political platforms and a conversion is less tricky to defend.
The ideological isolation of a party in most of the cases might be greater for extremist
parties, however this is not always the case. In fact, there could be a system with a
centrist party distant from clusters of parties on its right and/or left. In this case we
have a party that is not extreme, but that is isolated. To put it simply, ideological
extremism and isolation do not necessarily overlap. For this reason the two factors are
analysed separately. Following these arguments, I expect that:
Hypothesis 1 An extreme placement of the party in the political space favour
defections.
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Hypothesis 2 Less ideological isolation of parties favours defections.
Values, ideological clarity and stability
The limitation of using a spatial understanding of ideology is that it does not grasp
parties’ principles, which instead are determinant for legislators’ representational style
and – as a consequence – for switching. While it can be argued that parties’ placement
on the left-right scale indeed correspond to specific set of beliefs (Hinich and Munger
1992), it is problematic to exactly determine parties’ values by looking only at their
position on the left-right spectrum. Moreover, often the left-right continuum conceives
ideology only in terms of economic policy, while for my argument, the cultural dimension
is more relevant. This cultural dimension, called by Inglehart (1977) "the postmaterialist-
materialist cleavage" and by Kitschelt (1994) "authoritarian-libertarian cleavage", has
at its core the concepts of hierarchy and tolerance (Stubager 2010). Authoritarians
favour the rank ordering of individuals and dot not tolerate deviations from conventional
norms. On the contrary, libertarians promote parity in social interactions, and show a
high degree of tolerance for non-conformity. In other words, authoritarians stresses the
importance of law and order, while libertarian embody principles like personal freedom
and self-affirmation (Close 2016).
These values are crucial also for party switching. Indeed, we can expect that parties
with authoritarian values might also not be tolerant towards dissenting positions among
their members and legislators. Conversely, parties that promote libertarian values, might
encourage the expression of deviating positions. In Hirschman’s terms, I expect that
libertarian parties display a higher degree of "voice" which makes them more immune to
switching, while authoritarian parties, discourage "voice" and therefore leave no other
option to potential dissidents but exiting the party.
Ideology as values (static - II): Programmatic clarity
Parties’ platforms are often difficult to pin down exactly. There is always a certain
degree of uncertainty regarding parties’ stances on specific issues (Bräuninger and Giger
2016). According to Rovny (2012), parties intentionally keep their platforms vague,
because this is electorally helpful. Moreover, some parties have not only very
ambiguous policy platforms, but they also represent a wide range of values and beliefs.
To put it simply, not all parties have clear-cut ideologies. Indeed, Gunther and
Diamond (2001) use programmatic clarity to classify different kinds of parties.
According to the authors, catch-all parties are characterized by vague platforms, while
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programmatic and mass parties have clear policy manifestos and are ideologically sound
(Giebler et al. 2015). Gunther and Diamond (2001) state that parties with ambiguous
preferences have a greater ability to support coalitions as they can accommodate
partners thanks to their policy flexibility. Similarly, these kind of parties are also able
to host legislators with very different sets of beliefs. As there is no well-defined ideology,
there is also no pressure to stick to the party line and MPs have probably more room to
express their views, even when they are conflicting with each other. In Hirschman’s
scheme, in these parties the level of "voice" should be greater than in parties whose
platform is clearly defined and less flexible. As a consequence, the expectation is that
the lower the ideological clarity, the less likely that legislators will recur to switching.
The previous factors look at parties’ ideology at one specific point in time. However,
platforms are not stable over time and they can change significantly between two elections
(Schumacher, De Vries, and Vis 2013). For instance, parties from the right might shift
their policy preferences towards the centre or to more extreme positions and the same
can happen to leftist groups. The literature has studied why parties would modify their
platforms and it is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the several findings of this
stream of research (for a summary, see Fagerholm 2016). For the purpose of this work,
what matters are the consequences of these position shifts for the behaviour of MPs and
for the decision to change party.
According to Heller and Mershon (2005), "uncertainty about party policy makes it
likely that MPs will at times find party dictates on legislation to be at odds with their own
or their supporters’ preferences" (p.539). Similarly, Ames (2009) states that when parties
are unstable, legislators’ voting behaviour cannot be predicted by their affiliation and they
often defect with impunity. The research on party switching thus expects parties with
blurred and unstable platforms to witness more defections (Desposato 2006). Moreover,
as the literature on policy shifts has shown, parties usually change their platforms after
an electoral defeat (Somer-Topcu 2009). Poor electoral performances are one of the main
determinants of switching, as politicians leave their party if they fear an electoral loss
(Gherghina 2016; Klein 2016). A policy shift might therefore be considered as a clue for
electoral concerns that – in turn – might induce switching.
From a party perspective, a shift in the programmatic platform might also come
at a cost. Indeed, the change most likely will disappoint part of the party members,
no matter what triggers it (electoral defeats, leadership alternation). Some members
will feel the new course as a betrayal of the original parties’ values and will consider
the exit option in order to preserve them, and this is particularly true for parties with
well-defined ideologies (Salucci 2008). To summarize, parties with unstable platforms
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are more subjected to switching because programmatic change can disappoint part of
the membership. Moreover, a value review might be linked to an electoral defeat that
represents a great concern for legislators, who then might prefer to leave the sinking ship.
All these arguments lead to the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 3 Authoritarian values of parties favour defections.
Hypothesis 4 Programmatic clarity favours defections.
Hypothesis 5 Unstable ideological position favours defections.
Data, measurement and methods
The five hypotheses are tested using a self-collected dataset on all the defections1 that
occurred in twelve Western European democracies2 from 1999 to 2015. The unit of
analysis are party-years, that is one observation corresponds to a party in a given year.
The dependent variable (Switchers) counts the number of switchers that each party
witnessed within a year. As can been seen from the descriptive statistics (Table A1,
Appendix), the overall average number of switchers is low. Considering all countries
together, the mean number of changes per year is almost 0.6. Moreover, the variable’s
distribution is extremely skewed towards the left, i.e. most observations take value 0.
Turning to the independent variables, the first hypothesis looks at ideological
extremism. In order to calculate this, I retrieved parties’ position in the political space
from the CHES (variable LRgen 3). Then, I calculated the absolute value of the
distance between each party’s position and the centre of the spectrum, which equals 5.
The variable Extreme therefore ranges from 0 (centrist party) to 5 (extremist party). I
expect that when the variable Extreme increases, the number of switchers increases as
well.
The second hypothesis discusses the role of isolation, which is operationalized as
the average mean distance of a party from all the others in the system. Distances are
1I adopt a more restricted definition of switching, compared to the most used one by Heller and
Mershon (2009). While the two authors count as switches also label changes, I discarded them.
I considered as switching the following situations: switching to a party already existing, becoming
independent, party merging and splits and establishment of a new parliamentary group. Moreover, my
data have been collected through an analysis of parliamentary archives, therefore only in case the switch
has been recorded, I counted it.
2Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, The Netherlands,
Spain, United Kingdom. Norway and Switzerland are not included because they are not in the CHES.
Sweden and Portugal are not part of the dataset because of considerable problems in collecting the data
on defectors.
3It ranges from 0 (extreme left) to 10 (extreme right).
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calculated in absolute values. The variable obtained is called Isolation and as it increases,
the number of switchers should become smaller.
The third hypothesis analyses the connection between values and switching. In order
to measure how authoritarian are parties’ values, I retrieved parties’ position on the
so called GAL/TAN dimension 4 made available by the CHES. The index ranges from
0 (extreme GAL) to 10 (extreme TAN) and measures exactly how parties’ values are
close/far from the authoritarian tradition. The expectation is that the greater the score
of a party on the scale, the higher the number of defections.
The fourth hypothesis concerns the impact of programmatic clarity. The
operationalization of this variable is challenging. I decided to use the standard
deviation of each party’s position as calculated in the expert surveys (variable LRgen
sd). This indicator is far from being perfect, because it measures variation in experts’
perceived positions of a party. As Bräuninger and Giger (2016) point out, this variation
can either be the result of an effective programmatic vagueness, but it might also reveal
the difficulty faced by experts in placing parties on the ideological space. Nevertheless,
despite its limitations, this index is the best option given that other measures (e.g.
those proposed by Bräuninger and Giger (2016) or by Giebler et al. (2015)) are not
available for the full set of cases considered in this work. The expectation is that the
larger the standard deviation of a party’s position, the lower the number of switchers.
Finally, ideological stability is measured as shifts in parties’ position on the left-right
scale between two waves of the CHES (variable ∆ LRgen). As I am not interested in the
direction of the change, but only in its magnitude, the index is calculated in absolute
terms. As descriptive statistics reveal, the variable obtained ranges from 0, when a
party’s placement has not changed, to 2 (the maximum shift recorded)5. Based on the
fifth hypothesis, larger values of ∆ LRgen should correspond to a higher number of
defections.
For what concerns controls, I add the following five variables:
• Tenure: measures the years a party has been in parliament. Tenure is a proxy of
party institutionalization that might affect the level of switching witnessed (Ceron
2015).
• Governing status: I control for the governing status of a party because according to
several authors parties in power should be more immune to defections (Desposato
4Green-Alternative-Libertarian versus Traditional-Authoritarian-Nationalist continuum (Hooghe,
Marks, and Wilson 2002).
5The theoretical maximum is 10. Thus, ideological stability is the rule.
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2006; Di Virgilio, Giannetti, and Pinto 2012). The variable takes value 0 when a
party has been in opposition in a given year, and 1 otherwise. Scores were retrieved
by the ParlGov database.
• Size: calculated as seat share, it is included because the literature suggests that
smaller parties might be more subjected to switching (Heller and Mershon 2005;
Laver and Benoit 2003).
• Party system fragmentation: measured as the "effective number of parliamentray
parties" (ENPP) (Laakso and Taagepera 1979). I include this control because it has
been shown that the higher the level of fragmentation, the larger the opportunities
for defecting.
• Party system institutionalization: operationalized as electoral volatility, as one of
the most common index for party system instability (Chiaramonte and Emanuele
2015). I add this control because the literature has shown that defections are
more numerous in weakly institutionalized settings (Kreuzer and Pettai 2009;
Mainwaring 1998). Information on electoral volatility was retrieved from the
dataset by Emanuele (2015).
Given that my dependent variable is a count variable, data is analysed with a negative
binomial model, to account for the over-dispersion of the dependent variable6 (Long
1997). Moreover, in order to account for party size, I include an exposure variable that
measures it. This exposure variable allows to adjust the estimation for the amount of
opportunity an event has. In other words, it treats the count variable as a ratio. The
risk of omitting the exposure variable is that larger parties always result having a higher
number of switchers simply because they have a greater set of potential defectors. The
advantage of the exposure variable is that it can be included in the estimation as well. In
order to control for the hierarchical structure of the data, I use a random-effect model.
The final dataset includes 1217 observations, from 111 parties nested in 12 countries.
Results and discussion
The results of the multivariate statistical analysis are presented in Table 1. Each
hypothesis is tested separately from the others, in order to avoid potential problems of
multicollinearity. The first model looks at the relationship between parties’ extremism
and the number of switchers. According to Hypothesis 1, the expectation is that more
6As most of the observation take value 0, the variance of dependent variable exceeds the mean.
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Table 1: Results of Negative Binomial models of party switching (Random Effects)
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Tenure -0.017* -0.014 -0.018* -0.015+ -0.020*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Govt 0.250 0.244 0.195 0.210 0.210
(0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25)
ENPP -0.165 -0.141 -0.129 -0.137 -0.140
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11)
Seat share -2.266* -1.698+ -1.782+ -2.018* -2.135*
(0.98) (1.00) (0.98) (1.00) (1.00)
Volatility 0.022+ 0.021+ 0.024* 0.015 0.022+











Constant -4.628*** -4.780*** -4.139*** -5.655*** -3.164***
(0.68) (0.72) (0.64) (0.78) (0.69)
Country 0.231 0.253 0.262 0.166 0.294
(0.25) (0.26) (0.26) (0.23) (0.28)
Party 1.339** 1.553** 1.416** 1.651** 1.599**
(0.44) (0.49) (0.46) (0.51) (0.50)
Alpha (Ln) 1.031*** 0.996*** 1.032*** 0.940*** 0.990***
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
Observations 1.215 1.217 1.217 1.217 1.21
Number of groups 12 12 12 12 12
Wald chi2 (6) 25.20 24.73 19.99 32.95 19.50
Prob > chi2 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.003
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
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extremist parties should witness more switchers. The coefficient of the variable Extreme
is positive and statistically significant, thus in line with the hypothesis. This result
suggests that more extremist parties are not better able to maintain/enforce unity. The
effect of the variable is considerable, given that the number of defections for the most
extremist parties is above 2, while for centrist group the prediction is below the overall
mean (0.5) (Figure 1a).
Hypothesis 2 states that ideological isolation should represent a protection from
defections. On the contrary, the statistical analysis (Model 2) returns a positive and
significant coefficient for the variable Isolation. This means that the farer a party is
from the other groups in the system, the greater the number of switcher. The effect of
the variable is the largest observed (Figure 1b), as the expected number of switchers for
isolated parties is around 3. This finding might explained by the fact that there is no
point in changing affiliation when the original and receiving parties are so similar to
each other. The policy differences – and most likely also their governing/office status –
are so little that switching becomes pointless. If it is true that concealing a switch
between two contiguous parties might be easier, the risk is that switchers do not
achieve anything with their action, neither in policy or in office terms. Additionally, a
very isolated party has less chances to find potential partners in future elections and
therefore it risks an electoral defeat. Thus, those MPs who are seeking re-election might
be induced to change alliance. To summarize, no matter what the motivations of
switchers are, an isolated party is not a pay-off option and this might be why MPs tend
to leave them more frequently. This argument might also help us to explain why
switching does not occur very frequently: defection is costly and legislators are willing
to pay the price only if they fully reach their goals.
Turning to the variables that measure parties’ values, according to Hypothesis 3, the
closer to the TAN pole a party is, the greater the scope of defections. The coefficient
of the variable GAL/TAN in positive and statistically significant, hence in line with the
hypothesis. Parties that promote values like law and order are also less able to keep their
ranks together. Moreover, the effect of the variable is substantial. As it can be seen in
Figure 1c, a party with the maximum TAN score is expected to have almost 2 switchers,
whereas at the opposite end of the spectrum, the predicted number of defections is slightly
below the overall mean.
Based on Hypothesis 4, parties with more unclear platforms should witness less
switchers. As Model 4 shows, the coefficient of the variable LRgen sd is negative and
statistically significant. This result meets the expectation of Hypothesis 4 and it
implies that the larger the uncertainty around a party’s placement on the left-right
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scale, the lower the number of defections. The effect of LRgen sd is smaller compared
to other explanatory variables, yet not negligible. As Figure 1d reveals, very cohesive
groups are expected to witness 1.5 switchers, but this number falls below average for
parties with more unclear positions.
The fifth hypothesis (Model 5) finds also supports from the analysis. According to the
theory presented, the more unstable party positions are, the larger the scope of switching.
The related variable (∆ LRgen) has a positive sign and significant effect. As shown by
Figure 1e, parties that did not undergo through a substantial revision of their platforms
are expected to have 0.5 switchers, while parties with unstable programs witness almost
two defections per year.
Finally, for what concerns control variables, more experienced parties are – in line with
what predicted by the literature – also more stable (significant and negative coefficient).
Parties in government are usually considered to be more united than parties in opposition,
but my analysis returns a different result: variable Govt is positive, yet it does not reach
statistical significance. Interestingly enough, larger parties are also less subjected to
switching, in line with what found by research on other dimensions of party unity (Close
2016). At the party system level, the effect of fragmentation is not confirmed by the
analysis, as the coefficient of the variable ENPP is not statistically significant (and it
is negative, i.e. opposite to expectations). On the contrary, volatility seems to boost
parliamentary disunity. Very volatile elections are followed by a greater level of switching
during the legislative term. This finding supports the idea that defections are also the
product of low party system institutionalization.
To summarize the main findings, the analysis has shown the following ideological
traits are associated with a greater number of defections:
• Being an extremist party;
• Being a very isolated party in the political space;
• Embedding authoritarian values;
• Having a well defined ideological position;
• Having an unstable ideological position over time.
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Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to shed light on the relationship between party ideology and
unity, looking at a very specific form of party dis-unity, that is defection. The importance
of ideology has been largely neglected by both the literature on unity and the one on
switching. This paper tried to fill this gap, bringing parties and their ideological features
at the centre of the explanation.
Political parties profoundly influence the behaviour and attitudes of their MPs. As
Kam (2001) reminds us, party affiliation is a better predictor of a legislator’s behaviour
than his/her preferences. This argument suggests that party characteristics might be
linked to different levels of unity and switching. Among all parties’ features, ideology
has a determinant role in shaping MPs’ behaviour. Indeed, as clarified by Close (2016),
ideology affects both the representational style of MPs, who act in a more or less
independent way from their group, and the level of intra-party democracy, that is the
internal tolerance for dissenting views. I tested whether this argument holds also when
we look at party switching, that is another dimension of (dis)unity. Given that ideology
is a multifaceted concept, I looked at whether various understandings of ideology are
associated with different levels of defections. The results of my analysis confirmed this
intuition, as all the ideological variables tested have a significant and (in most of the
cases) substantial effect on the number of defections experienced by the parties
analysed. These results are particularly solid as they hold across twelve polities and
more than 15 years. To put it simply, my analysis shows that ideology, in its various
meanings, is indeed linked with different levels of party switching.
My theoretical expectations and results are partially conflicting with previous
literature on unity In particular, ideological extremism, clarity and isolation have
proven to induce switching, rather than reducing it. Also the result that parties with
authoritarian values are more unstable contradicts the finding that extreme right
groups are usually more united (like, for instance, Mejia Acosta 2004). Nevertheless,
the results of my analysis are coherent with each other. In particular, extremism,
isolation, authoritarianism, and programmatic clarity, are all characteristics that can be
theoretically associated to a smaller room for dissent. Therefore, the fact that these
features are all related to higher number of defections suggests that switching occurs in
those parties that do not allow multiple views, but rather impose one strict line. In
other words, switching is trigged by an absence of "voice". On the contrary, parties
that grant to their members more freedom of opinion are more immune to "exit". To
put it simply, Hirschman’s scheme seems to work fairly well when applied to switching.
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Clearly, this is only one plausible explanation to make sense of the findings of my
analysis. More theoretical work is needed to shed light on what makes more authoritarian
parties so exposed to defection. What it is specific of authoritarian ideology that makes
parties less tolerant towards different opinions and views? Moreover, the results of my
analysis would benefit from any index that could capture and measure the level of voice
granted to party members and MPs. To put it differently, my results would be more solid
if I could show that the features that are linked with more switching are also predictors
for lower levels of intra-party democracy. The challenge is to find a good indicator for
all the countries and the time frame covered by my dataset. It is for this reason that,
for instance, I could not use for this work the index developed by the Political Party
Database (Poguntke et al. 2016).
Alternatively, I could try to look at different kinds of defections. Under the label
"switching" fall indeed different types of behaviour. In particular we can distinguish
between individual and collective forms of switching. Individual defectors are those who
change party affiliation without coordinating with other fellows. Collective switches,
instead, are rather the results of party merges or splitting. In this case, individual MPs
switch in order to stay faithful to their faction. The underlying logic of collective and
individual switching are different and the mechanisms that lead to these two forms of
defections might also not be the same. Looking at these two types of switching separately
might help to test whether parties from different ideological traditions experience different
kinds of defections. For instance, switchers from authoritarian parties might change
affiliation only collectively, while – on the contrary – more libertarian parties might
be more subjected to individual movements, as an effect of the representational style
promoted by these groups.
Moreover, it is plausible that some of the factors analysed in this paper explain better
one form of switching than the other. For instance, ideological stability and isolation
might be at the origin of collective changes. A programmatic shift might trigger the
reaction of an entire factions that does not approve the ideological revision, like in the
aforementioned case of the Italian Communist Party. Similarly, very isolated parties
might arrive at a stage in their political life in which they have to decide whether they
want to make compromise and get fully involved or to stay away from any possible
coalition. The tension generated by these two contrary strategy might as well result in a
split between the two opposing factions. To summarize, when we take into account the
collective or individual nature of defections, the five ideological factors analysed in this
paper might not have the same explanatory power.
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Appendix
Table A1: Descriptive statistics
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Year 1223 2.006 4.82 1999 2015
Switchers 1223 .576 3.24 0 74
Seat 1223 5.296 7.67 1 419
LRgen 1223 4.887 2.22 .22 9.888
GAL/TAN 1223 4.748 2.28 .63 9.75
LRgen sd 1216 .861 .37 0 3.420
Tenure 1223 3.475 2.10 0 70
Seat share 1223 .154 .15 .002 .636
ENPP 1223 4.434 1.96 2.119 9.054
∆ Lrgen 1223 .41 .368 0 2.088
Extreme 1223 1.925 1.11 0 4.888
Volatility 1217 1.391 7.37 4 48.50
Govt 1223 .389 .487 0 1
Isolation 1223 2.783 .86 1.115 5.855
